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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

RUTH GUENTHER JORGENSEN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No. 16193

vs.
RAY LYNN JORGENSEN,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the Fourth Judicial District
Court wherein the Honorable J. Robert Bullock, District
Judge, heard a contested divorce on a complaint and
counterclaim involving paternity and custody of children,
and the acquisition and division of real and personal
prop~rty.

The court awarded real property acquired after

the separation of the parties to respondent and divided
the per son a 1 property,

including the balance of the

!JTSPOST'I'ION

f'<·o·'[H>ndc nt

l·:as

PJ LO;ii·:R COURT

'-Jl':ll1t.<'d

a di

vonce

on his counterclaim
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children, age 3, the real property, and one-half of the
personal property.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The decision of the trial court should be affirmed
by this court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties were

~arried

to each other at Salt Lake

City, Utah, on the 17th day of August, 1972, and thereafter, respondent tolerated an unfaithful wife who dated
other men and had at least two affairs during the period
of the marriage (Find. No. 7, R-P.25).

The second child

was born May 25, 1978, approximately one month prior to
the separation of the parties at a time when appellant
was

h~ving

an affair with another man and under circum-

stances where nobody knew for sure who the father of the
child v1as.
Though appellant alleged in her complaint that respondent was the father, she privately advised respondent he \vas not the father of Stacy Lynn Jorqcnsen and
would not

h~ve

to pay child support for her.

Ilccuusc of

recent decisions relating to res judicuta and collateral
estoppel, rL'SpOn<lcnt chose to call in question the
paternity of SL1cy Lynn Joi-<JL'nscn ror the l'\li['<JSe of

-'-
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obtaining blood tests and to pursue the legal rationale
of Miller v. Marticorena (Utah), 531 P.2d 487 (1975).
As stated in the Findings of Fact No. 3 (R-P.24), the
trial judge invited counsel to the bench to advise the
court on the scope of the paternity issue, at which time
counsel for both parties advised the court that there was
no issue as to the paternity of either child, respondent
being not only satisfied, but extremely pleased with the
results of the blood test, later admitted in evidence

(R-P.88,114).

The issue of paternity of Stacy Lynn

Jorgensen was therefore not a result of the counterclaim
of respondent, but rather, appellant's insistence that
she not be saddled with respondent as the father of her
youngest child, regardless of the blood test.

It was

appellant's position at the trial that her live-in boy
friend (with whom she was having an affair during the
marriage)

is in fact the father of Stacy Lynn (R-P.67).

There was a conflict in the evidence as to whether
or not there was $4,200.00 in the bank at the time the
parties separated, or $4,853.73 (R-P.67).

Based upon

the testimony of the parties and the evidence of bills
palrt by respondent from that account, the court concluded

that the account had $4,200.00 when the parties separated
-3-
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and approximately $600.00 when the parties stipulated on
an order to show cause that no further funds would be
withdrawn from the account after payment of the repair
bills due on appellant's car (R-P.SS, L.7-15, P.llO, L.4).
After the parties separated and after respondent
paid the bills incurred during the marriage (and prior
to the divorce hearing), respondent elected to purchase
real estate in accordance with preliminary arrangements
made prior to the separation of the parties, and respondent's parents were substituted in place of appellant by
requirPment of the financing institution and to secure
their loan of the down payment to responoent (R-P.52,
L.l6).

Appellant's statement that "the court awarded the

house, tog0thcr with the $6,000.00 equity thereunder, to
defenoant-responoent" has no evidenciary support except
as an infer0nce from facts found otherwise by the court.
ARGUI1EUT
POINT I
TilE m:CIS!Cl!J OF '''liE TPTAL CCll'ET TO PLliCE flRAD EAY
,Tlll\f~l:l:St:;; \\IT!!
J.:l:SPCJ:;nENT IS r'LJLLY ,n;s•r'JI'l ED BY
'J'llE EVI n!:NCE PPJ:~;J:'NED l\'1' TP1 AL MJD THE LA\/ OF
Tll IS S'l'i\'T'E.

point nut to

th~.---

nar

t~1e1t

L'.C.i'\..

30-3-10 dc-,t's

not

,-,~~1-JlY
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to divorce cases but is only applicable in cases of
separation, and that the controlling statute is
30-3-5.

u.c.A.

Sampsell v. Holt, 15 Utah 73, 202 P.2d 550

(1949); Johnson v. Jonnson, 7 Utah 2d 263, 323 P.2d
16 (1958).

U.C.A. 30-1-5 provides:

lfuen a decree of divorce is made, the court
may make such orders in relation to the children, property and parties, and the maintenance
of the parties and the children, as may be equitable. The court shall have continuing jurisdiction to make such subsequent changes or
new orders with respect to the support and
maintenance of the parties, and custody of
the children and their support and maintenance, or the distribution of the property
as shall be reasonable and necessary •••
Further, our statutes and case law allow the trial
court "considerable discretion" in child custody matters.
Rice v. Rice (Utah 1977), 564 P.2d 305.
The record shows that after the birth of Brad Ray
Jorgensen, respondent provided personal care and attention for said child equal to that of the mother (R-P.79);
that respondent had made a special effort to take his
son with him and to spend his spare time with his son,
and that a close relationship existed between the father
and the son (R-P.lOl); that respondent spent evenings
at

ho~e

with his son while appellant was out of the home

nn a pretext, but in iact having an affair with another
-5-
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man (R-P.64); that the respondent took the responsibility
for bathing, clothing, feeding, caring for and giving
security to said child when the appellant chose to be
elsewhere (R-P.78).
On the other hand, the record shows that appellant
spent evenings cooking in other men's apartments (R-P.71);
dated other men (R-P.SO); had an affair with another man
in Idaho Falls, Idaho (R-P.69); and had another affair
with a man for about a year prior to her separation from
respondent (R-P.64), who at the time of the divorce hearing, was a live-in boy friend who she claimed to be the
father of her youngest child (R-P.67, L.l); that she was
considering moving to vlashington and taking the children
with her (R-P.73, L.9); that like respondent, appellant
was working and was taking the children to a baby-sitter
during her regular hours oi employment (R-P.60, L.l5).
The court was acting in the best interest of the child
in concluding that the environment and lifestyle provided
by appellant was not equal to that offered by respondent,
but that appellant could qualify to be a fit and proper
person for custody of Stacy Lynn.
The Supn•r;1e Court's i nterpr0tat ion of the statute,
and the oft-<JnnounrC'Il rule that "all things b0ing equol,
-G-
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custody of children of tender years.should be placed
with the mother" is hopefully designed to avoid habitual
placement at the lowest acceptable standard of welfare
services, rather than overlook the shortcomings of a
mother just because she is the mother.

Appellant alleges

that because the trial court did not find her "unfit•,
she is therefore entitled to a custody preference.

But

a finding of "unfitness" is the standard by which any
court can take children away from any parent.

The differ-

ence was clearly distinguished by the Supreme Court of
Montana in Henderson v. Henderson (Hont.l977), 568 P.2d
177, at Page 181:
The "best interest of the child" test is correctly used to determine custody rights between
natural parents in divorce proceedings.
In
this situation the "equal rights" to custody
which both the father and mother possess ••• are
weighed in relation to each parent's ability
to provide best for the child's physical,
mental, and emotional needs upon the breakdown
of the marital relationship.
"Fitness" of each
parent is determined only in relation to the
other and not to society as a whole.
The Montana court then explained that where parties
who are not parents seek custody of children, they must
first show that the natural parents' conduct does not
meet the minimum standards of child abuse, neglect and
depcnclcncy statutes, and they must be found to be unfit
-7Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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parents.

Such was not the case here.

The emotional

instability of the appellant manifested by her desires
for reconciliation and her reluctance to leave her livein boy friend (R-P.BS) contrasts rather markedly with the
stability and reliability of respondent.

The lifestyle

of appellant could be severely damaging to a 3-year-old
attempting to relate to a father image, though not so
crucial to a 6-month-old baby.
Appellant states in her brief at Page 12 that her
former lifestyle and live-in arrangement are now moot in
view of her affidavit and the changes she has made since
the trial.

Though such changes may be highly commend-

able, they are certainly after the fact and not part of
the evidPnce upon which the trial judge could rest his
decision, and for the same reason this honorable court
cannot consider the alleged change of circumstances as
bearing on the propriety of the trial court's decision.
The trial court's (lPcision was based on the evi<lence at
trial and not on the
three

TC~Onths

a11e~ations

of an rlffidavit filed

later in connection \"ith this <1ppcnl.

l'ncler the l'rron<>nus concept of "unfi tnc'Sc;" Lil'iJcllant
cont cn(ls on ra,Jc 7

t)f

ht'r

l~:ie>f

thot

Pntitled to t·hc ru:;toc1y of the c'hilc1

''t

iJP

r'tOt ;l('r

unlc,ss

is

it is n-1de
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Such is not the law that has

to appear to the contrary".

painstakingly evolved over the past thirty years in the
State of Utah.

A divorced mother is not entitled, as a

matter of law, to custody of a child of tender years,
merely because there is no showing that she is an improper
or unfit person.

Johnson v. Johnson, supra; Sampsell

v. Holt, supra.

The basic rule announced by the court

in Hyde v. Hyde, 22 Utah 2d 429, 454 P.2d 884 (1969)
and confirmed in Smith v. Smith (Utah 1977), 564 P.2d
307, recognizes that the mother has no statutory preference as suggested in 30-3-10, U.C.A., and its statutory
predecessors, but confirms the concept that parents'
rights to custody are equal under the law and that mother
gets the preference only if the evidence before the court
is equal or in her favor.

The evidence before the trial

court relating to appellant's lifestyle, her emotional
instability, her possible removal from this state, and
the general behavior of appellant in the marriage constituted an evidenciary inequality that could not be
iqnored by the trial judge, and because of that inequality appellant had no preference before the court, and the
cotirt's ruling on custody does not offend the rule of law
011unciated by the

Supre~e

Court of the State of Utah.
-9-
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For these reasons the rationale of Baker v.__!laker,
110 Utah 462, 175 P.2d 213 (1946)
White v. White,

and the dictum from

29 Utah 2d 148, 506 P.2d 69

(1973) quoted

on Page 9 of appellant's brief serve only to strengthen
respondent's position, though perhaps legally not applicable.

~emonstrated

The

lifestyle of appellant, to which

she herself has testified, can hardly be compared with
the relatively innocuous behaviour of Steiger v. Steiger,
4 Utah 2d 273, 293 P.2d 418 (1956) or Stuber v. Stuber,
121 Utah 632,

244 P.2d 650

(1952).

cites llf'ndccson v. Henderson

(Utah 1978), 576 P.2d 1289

on Page 10 of her brief, but the
phr~so

the last

having been

Appellant further

~uote

is not accurate,

omitted, and it should read

as follmvs:
As to the issue of child custody, both parties
rely on and cite substantially the same cases
pn•viol!sly de>cicled by this court, ;ond while
those ,.,J,;os clo ~c;tand 'or the proposition that
e\:_<"_r_yt J::_ i ncLJ::o_~n_'} _ _£TJaJ:_, pre f e rc•ncc s:wu] d be
qiv0n to l!1c "1othcr in c1ctc>rf'1ininq c\lstody,
thoy ,,] so say that the best inl0rests and \vel~.lrC'

n7 t h0 c!1i lr1rcn

',1-,c;-t-or.

h'ith nnly sl iqht
the

v.
\'.

h:1~~is
r~i l .. t ....

fnr ,1c•(.. i~;inn

Stl~ r~~,

~i_;~·l_\~~~

is -t-})_o_ -c~~tf~J}-=_iJlq-

(crq>hasi s qi\'C'n)
\'ariation,
in Hyde v.

Jill'' ~':ll-l': s

~t·tz1h

~t 1

\'.

lhe

S,l,~l·2

Hyrle,

lltl!'li1~1l-l'~··s,

c>'~ncept

~'22T_~,
~ !J1-ra

I

\·.·as

Rice
,]JJ(1

B~ :Jclr;.J.rl

7~)
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stated at Page 704:
The plaintiff grounds her attack upon the order
on the rule to which we agree as a general
proposition:
That it is presumed to be for the
best interest and welfare of a child of tender
years to be with her mother. However, under
the modern trend of social thinking away from
former fixed rigidities, toward equality of
the sexes and greater flexibility in considering the qualifications of the parents on an
individual basis, that presumption is suboroinate to the higher rule that the paramount
concern in such cases is the best interest and
welfare of the child.
The court concluded its opinion in Bingham with
the following comment on Page 704:
Inasmuch as the evidence does not clearly preponderate against the findings and order of
the trial court, as would be required for
reversal, but on the contrary seemed to clearly
preponderate in favor of those findings, the
order made is well within the prerogatives of
the trial court in such matters.
POINT II

·ro 1\PPELLJ\NT ONE-HALF
OF THE ,JOINT SAVINGS ACCOUNT AFTER THE BILLS
IlEnE PAID.
'1'H E COURT PRO!'ERL Y Al'll\RDED

Appellant was uncertain as to the time she checked
the joint savings account, and her testimony under questioning by her attorney is on Pages 58 and 59 of the
rcc:oro:
Q.

I "sked you to secure the balance or the
cl n"c-nut of the ch<'cking acc:ount after you
-11-
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were separated. What were the balances
right before the 19th of June?
A.

40-8 .••

Q.

What were the exact figures that you gave
back to me?

A.

Yes.

Q.

That's the sum of money that was in the
account?

A.

Yes.

Q.

On what day is that?
June?

A.

Yes, 5/22.

Q.

Or the 20th day of !lay?

A.

Urn

It was $4,853.73.

Is that the 20th of

hum.

Appellant testified under cross-examination that the
account had a balance of $4,853.20 as of the 22nd day of
l~y

and that she did check the account when the parties

separated in ,Tune but she couldn't remember what the
bal.1nce v.·as at that time

(R-P.67).

On the other hand,

re>sponnent testifien in no uncertain terms that he with<lrcw the sum of $4,2fl0.00 and pain the bills outstanding
at

t

hat t inc

( R- P p . 53 , 54 ) .

The ba 1 a:1ce in the acc-ount

,1ftc>r payn0nt of the oills,

e~nr1

partil'ULorly the bill on

-1~-
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court with respect to that balance is fully set forth in
the record at Page 110:
THE COURT:

I have concluded that I'm going to
grant Mr. Lynn Jorgensen a decree of
divorce on his counterclaim; further,
that the home, there isn't any equity
in the house, that the monies were
expended in payment of family obligations with the exception of $600.00
which is still left •••

In the findings of fact and the decree of divorce,
that figure was adjusted to $653.00 to avoid the very
onus that appellant now desires to put upon respondent
on expenditure of some of the money for his personal
utility bills after separation.
It is also true that as compared with respondent's
estimate, appellant undervalued the household furniture
and furnishings by $753.00 (R-Pp.55,71; Pltfs. Exh. No.
1).

In every particular, respondent was more than equit-

able in his valuations and his reporting of assets.

Had

the court determined to divide the $4,200.00 equally as
of the date of separation, the court likewise would have
been free to divide the obligations as of the same date,
and the result would have been exactly the same.
Counsel for appellant had an opportunity to further
,·xamine respondent as to any discrepancies between the
-13Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

balance in the account and the total of the bills he
testified he paid, and the failure to do so cannot now be
laid to respondent's doorstep.
Finally, the total of the bills paid by respondent
is $3,571.44, and that figure deducted from the $4,200.00
the trial court found to have been the amount withdrawn
by respondent leaves a balance of $628.56, virtually the
exact balance that respondent testified was in the account
at the time of trial and available for division, and it
would therefore appear that the figure of $737.50 set
forth on Page 14 of appellant's brief is an error.

The

appellant cannot be serious in suggesting that the debts
paid were any more respondent's debts than appellant's
debts, espcci,1lly in view of the fact that a sizeable
repair bill was paid on her car as the last withrlrawal
from that account by agrccr,1ent of the parties at the order
to show cause on the 14th day of July, 1978.

While it

is true that the tricll court's decision did operate to
r<'li'-'VP l"l'Spnndent of debts inrurrod cluring the marria<Je,
it also <'pc>ratc•d to n'l icve dppcll ant of any surh debts,
,1ncl thc•rc is no <]LH'stion t·'1at app<•ll.1nt's

fnunc1 l)y thl"

t-ri,ll

co~Hluct

in the

cnui·t.
-

l
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Humphreys v. Humphreys (Utah 1974), 520 P.2d 193,
cited by appellant, is hardly authority for the line of
reasoning adopted by appellant.

Contrary to the sugges-

tion of appellant, the trial court did not allow respondent to spend any of the money·he withdrew.

The spending

took place and the debts were paid immediately after
separation of the parties, and full disclosure was made
to appellant and her attorney at the order to show cause
hearing held the 14th day_ of July, 1978.
si~ply

The trial court

recognized that by virtue of the payments made by

respondent, the parties had no outstanding debts at the
time of the divorce hearing, and the balance in the
account was then equally divided by the court.
CONCLUSION
The awarding of custody is no easier now than it was
for Solomon, and whatever principles are used to determine custody, a loving person may be deeply wounded.

To

mjnimize the trauma to the chjld, the courts have long
held that the best interest and welfare of the child is
the paramount consideration.

The court was justified

f1·om the cviclcnce presented in considering the emotional
inst~bility

of the appellant, her lifestyle, the possi-

Lility of her removal to the State of Washington, and her
-15Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

behavior in the marriage relationship to determine if all
things were equal between the parties.

Likewise, the

court was justified from the evidence in considering the
stability of the respondent, his unusually close relationship with his 3-year-old son, his interest in actively
pursuing the role of a parent with said child, and his
lifestyle and demonstrated conduct in the marriage.

The

evidence supports the court's conclusion that all things
were not equal between the parties, and from the preponderance of evidence the court was justified in placing the
custody of the minor child with the respondent, recognizing that

su~h

placer:1ent might be subject to change

as conditions in the future may warrant.
Further, the court's finding that the bank account
less the balance remaining was used to pay joint obligations incurred during the marriage is fully justified by
the evidence, and the order dividing the balance in the
acco1111t bPtween the

pe~rties

and dividing the other per-

son,1l property Y.'as C<]llitable to appellant in the highest
tleqr-ce consistent with the principles <JOVcrning divorce.
I\c•sl'O!ldcnt's

later

d.ecisjon

to borro\._' money

J'-1n':lts ,lntl buy the hone as an

in·_;c·s~_-,,'nt

[rom his

has nothing to

do 1:ith .1ppellant bcc,Hrse of i1vr --,-nli'c·st <lisintccrcst

-lGSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and her waiver of participation by living elsewhere and
demanding that half the bank account be paid to her in
cash.

And based upon such evidence, the court found

that there was no equity in the home to which appellant
was entitled, and there is no evidence to the contrary.
Respectfully submitted this

~

day of April,

1979.
BEAtf, BEAN

&

SMEDLEY

Attorney for Defendant and
Respondent
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